The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism by marijvanstrien@gmail.com & Marij van Strien
The Norton Dome and the Nineteenth Century Foundations of Determinism 
 
By: Marij van Strien 
 
In this paper, I connect the contemporary discussion in philosophy of physics about the Norton dome 
with nineteenth century literature on similar physical systems, and I show that what is currently the 
standard conception of determinism in classical physics was not generally accepted in nineteenth 
century France.  
 
We usually consider classical mechanics as the prime example of a deterministic theory, but Norton has 
shown in 2003 that there are possible systems in classical mechanics which are not deterministic, 
notably the system which has become known as the Norton dome. This is regarded as a newly 
discovered instance of indeterminism in classical physics and it has raised quite some discussion among 
philosophers of physics in the last few years.1 However, I show that the same instance already appeared 
during the nineteenth century. I discuss four nineteenth-century French authors who wrote about such 
systems, namely Siméon Denis Poisson, Jean-Marie Duhamel, Joseph Boussinesq and Joseph Bertrand, 
and examine their ideas about determinism.  
 
The kind of indeterminism that is at issue in Norton's dome can be called "Lipschitzindeterminism", and 
amounts to the fact that the differential equations which are the equations of motion of a certain 
system may not have a unique solution for given initial conditions. The Norton dome is a system 
consisting of a mass point on top of a dome of a particular shape, for which it can be shown that the 
mass point can roll off at an undetermined time. In an article about the Norton dome, Malament 
discusses also another possible Lipschitz-indeterministic system in which a particular force acting on a 
point particle leaves the motion of the particle undetermined.2 
 
These systems violate what is currently our standard conception of determinism in classical physics, 
namely the statement that for each system in classical physics, there are differential equations of 
motion of the form d^2r/dt^2 = F(r), which, together with the initial conditions r(t0) = r0 and dr/dt (t0) = 
v0 uniquely determine the future states of the system. This is the formulation of determinism in classical 
physics that is used in most contemporary literature.3  In this way, determinism can be understood as a 
theorem in classical physics, rather than as a metaphysical conviction, such as the idea that every event 
has a cause.  
 
In this paper I consider whether the fact that Lipschitz-indeterministic systems were known in the 
nineteenth century (though not under this name) means that determinism in physics was not universally 
accepted at that time. I argue that the example itself did not convince many people that there was 
indeterminism in physics. The reason for this is that the authors which I discuss employed alternative 
conceptions of determinism in physics which were not necessarily violated by Lipschitz-indeterministic 
systems.  
 
In 1806, Poisson discussed the possibility that the equations of motion for a physical system do not have 
a unique solution.4  Of the two examples that he discussed, one was analogous to the recent one by 
Malament, in which a particular force acting on a point particle leaves the motion of the particle 
undetermined. Poisson emphasized that in these cases, one had to find out which solution was the 
'right' one; this involved additional physical considerations which were not captured in the laws of 
motion. The issue was treated in a largely similar way by Duhamel in 1845.5  For both, determinism was 
not equal to the statement that there was for each system a set of differential equations with a unique 
solution, for it might be that the equations had several solutions without there being a failure of 
determinism. Therefore, the possibility of Lipschitz-indeterministic systems did not imply that there was 
actual indeterminism.  
 
Lipschitz-indeterministic systems played an important role in the work of Boussinesq, who, in 1878, 
discussed several such systems, one of which was similar to the Norton dome.6  Boussinesq used these 
cases of physical indeterminism as the foundation of an elaborate theory about free will and 
organization in living organisms, a theory which drew quite some attention at the time. 
 
Boussinesq attributed great significance to the fact that the equations of motion could have non-unique 
solutions, yet he regarded these equations themselves as approximations or idealizations of what 
happens in reality. In a criticism of Boussinesq's theory, the famous mathematician Joseph Bertrand 
showed that this made Boussinesq's theory highly problematic.7  Bertrand himself also argued that 
differential equations such as the equations of motion are approximations of what really happens. He 
argued that therefore, the indeterminism that these equations can exhibit does not have to be reflected 
in real physical systems. Bertrand's conviction that there was determinism was not grounded in the 
theorem that there are for each system differential equations which have a unique solution, but was 
rather a metaphysical conviction.  
 
In the contemporary literature on Norton's dome, there has been a debate about the idealizations on 
which the example depends, such as the assumption that the dome is infinitely smooth and rigid and 
that the particle can move frictionless over the surface of the dome. Korolev for example has argued 
that the resulting indeterminism is no more than an artefact of such idealizations.8  This has triggered 
some discussion about which idealizations are "allowed" in Newtonian mechanics. This discussion 
centres on the properties of the theory rather than on what is possible in reality. The discussion 
between Boussinessq and Bertrand, however, shows that for them there were more fundamental issues 
involved about the relation between mathematics and reality, as they argued that differential equations 
in general involved idealizations.  
 
To conclude, Lipschitz-indeterministic systems only imply a violation of determinism if determinism is 
defined as the statement that in a classical system, the differential equations of motion are rigorously 
valid and these equations alone determine the future states of the system. Though this statement is 
now our standard conception of determinism in classical physics, it was still in a state of development 
during the nineteenth century. The authors that I discuss diverged from this definition in various ways 
and had various alternative conceptions of determinism. Though determinism as a general metaphysical 
principle was seldom doubted, it was not necessarily founded on a physical theorem about the 
uniqueness of solutions to certain differential equations.  
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